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Abstract
This article provides an international law context for Korea’s Low Carbon, Green Growth 
Fundamental Act (the “LCGGFA”) in order to illustrate potential applications of the LCGGFA 
in multinational forest conservation-related projects. The international law of sustainable 
development and ongoing efforts to address climate change are described. Korea’s relevant 
history and recent lawmaking are then introduced, with a special focus upon the LCGGFA’s 
structure and its distinctive features. The article then analyzes potential transplantations of 
various concepts and structures of the LCGGFA to other legal systems. The final section of the 
article focuses upon particular methods by which Korean law and policy can facilitate forestry-
related conservation and sustainable economic development projects, such as in heavily 
rainforested nations of Southeast Asia. I hope that this assessment will prove helpful as 
governments and private parties consider concrete steps to achieve durable and equitable carbon 
emission reductions in the forestry sector.
I. Introduction
Rainforests are frequently described in terms that underscore their 
central ecological value to the planet, both as generating vital utility and as 
possessing indefinable intrinsic worth. Whether referenced as “the world’s 
lungs”1) or “a renaissance painting,”2) the rhetoric surrounding rainforests 
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by the SNU Brain Fusion program. Thank you to Christopher Song and Claire Chung for 
helpful research and comments. My thanks as well to the participants in the Korea-Indonesia 
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1) See, e.g., The world’s lungs, Economist, Sept. 23, 2010, available at http://www.economist.
com/node/17093495.
2) To quote biologist E.O. Wilson, “Destroying rainforest for economic gain is like 
burning a Renaissance painting to cook a meal.” R. Z. Sheppard, Nature: Splendor in The Grass, 
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resounds with their significance to human prosperity and well-being. 
However, efforts to develop domestic and international policies that 
successfully safeguard the preservation of rainforests have proven, at best, 
insufficient to reverse the global trend of continual elimination of vast tracts 
of forest.3) While preserving the diversity and richness of forest ecosystems 
is a significant policy goal,4) the carbon emissions-impact of deforestation5) 
and its significant contribution to the accumulation of greenhouses gases in 
the Earth’s atmosphere6) has propelled aforestation and reforestation to 
prominence in international environmental law and policy discourse.7) 
Recent efforts to curb rainforest destruction have sought to recognize the 
simultaneous need in rainforest-dense nations to achieve economic 
timE Sep. 3, 1990.
3) Deforestation has been occurring rapidly; between 1990 and 2005, the global rate was 
approximately 13 million hectares of net deforestation per year. Erin C. Myers Madeira, 
PoliciEs to REducE Emissions fRom dEfoREstation and dEgRadation (REdd) in dEvEloPing 
countRiEs 18 (2008). The rate of deforestation is relatively higher in the tropical rainforest 
regions, which are particularly dense carbon sinks. FAO, UNDP and UNEP, un 
collaboRativE PRogRammE on REducing Emissions fRom dEfoREstation and foREst dEgRadation 
in dEvEloPing countRiEs (un-REdd) 1 (2008), available at http://www.un-redd.org/
AboutUNREDDProgramme/tabid/583/Default.aspx. See also R. A. Butler, A World Imperiled: 
Forces behind Forest Loss, tRoPical RainfoREsts: imPERilEd RichEs—thREatEnEd RainfoREsts 
(2007), available at http://rainforests.mongabay.com.
4) See Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, climatE changE PoliciEs in thE asia-
Pacific: RE-uniting climatE changE and sustainablE dEvEloPmEnt 81–85 (2008). 
5) Land use changes (especially in the context of deforestation) account for approximately 
15 to 20 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, more than the total worldwide emissions 
attributable to the transportation sector. See Van der Werf et al., CO2 emissions from forest loss, 
natuRE gEosciEncE 737–38 (2009); Erin C. Myers Madeira, PoliciEs to REducE Emissions fRom 
dEfoREstation and dEgRadation (REdd) in dEvEloPing countRiEs 18–19 (2008); Daniel Zarin et 
al., Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD): An Options Assessment 
Report 1 (2009), available at http://www.redd-oar.org/links/REDD-OAR_en.pdf.
6) Forest destruction and degradation account for the second-largest source of carbon 
emissions, after fossil fuel combustion. H. H. Rogner et al., Introduction, in climatE changE 
2007: mitigation (B. Metz et al., eds. 2007).
7) To reference just one illustration, in comments made after accepting the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 2009, United States President Barack Obama stated, “[Aforestation is] probably the 
most cost-effective way for us to address the issue of climate change ― having an effective set 
of mechanisms in place to avoid further deforestation and hopefully to plant new trees.” John 
Vidal, Copenhagen: Barack Obama backs Norway-Brazil forest protection plan, thE guaRdian (Dec. 
10, 2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/10/obama-backs-
norway-brazil-forest-plan.
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development while maintaining the integrity of ecosystems.8) It is of critical 
importance to consider what administrative approaches may be adapted 
and utilized to harness the dual demands of environmental and economic 
vitality, and thus to meaningfully progress towards stable and enduring 
aforestation outcomes.9)
The history of the Republic of Korea (“Korea”) since the devastating 
consequences of the Korean War has been one of continual reinvention.10) 
In less than 60 years, Korea has experienced numerous political upheavals, 
most recently and dramatically the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and 
the subsequent transition to procedurally fair elections and the 
implementation of democratic institutions.11) Its rapid economic growth has 
been driven, in part, by several economic transformations. These economic 
reinventions have corresponded to fundamental changes in the legal and 
social conditions of the nation.12) However, until recently, there have been 
few credible indications of an enforced legal commitment to environmental 
protection.13)
The simultaneous desire for new sources of economic growth and 
expanding popular support for serious and internationally accountable 
environmental responsibility has most recently provided the catalyst for 
8) See Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, supra note 4, at 79–100.
9) This article considers as part of international forestry-related policy both aforestation 
(the cessation of deforestation in a particular area during a specified and aspirationally 
perpetual time horizon) and reforestation (the restoration of forest cover to previously 
deforested areas).
10) This is a national image that Korean state institutions deliberately seek to cultivate 
and promote, especially in presenting Korea as a model of rapid development and transition 
from the developing world to the developed one. In fact, the objective of raising Korea’s 
international stature and reputation is an explicitly stated legislative objective of the recently 
promulgated Low Carbon, Green Growth Fundamental Act. In three separate articles, the 
LCGGFA states a purpose related to improving or advancing Korea’s status in the 
international community. Jeotanso Noksaekseongjang Gibonbeop [Low Carbon, Green 
Growth Fundamental Act]  No. 9931, Jan. 13, 2010. 
11) See generally michaEl J. sEth, a concisE histoRy of modERn KoREa: fRom thE latE 
ninEtEEnth cEntuRy to thE PREsEnt (2010); Tom Ginsburg, Introduction: The Politics of Legal 
Reform in Korea, in lEgal REfoRm in KoREa (Tom Ginsburg, ed. 2004).
12) See e.g., Jisoon Lee, gREEn gRowth, 24–31 (2010).
13) Hong Sik Cho, The Pathology of Korea’s Under-Enforcement of Environmental Law: Is 
Public Awareness and Deliberation the Key to Success?, 4. u. toKyo J. l. and Pol., 47, 47–64 (2007).
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Korea’s “green growth vision.”14) First articulated by current Korean 
President Lee Myung-Bak in 2008,15) and embedded in statutory law by the 
Low Carbon, Green Growth Fundamental Act (the “LCGGFA” or the 
“Act”)16) in 2010, Korean green growth is promoted as a simultaneous 
revolution in the foundational elements of the Korean economy and a 
dramatic step in the direction of serious environmental protection.
Korea’s recent history of rapid economic development and its modern 
approach of synthesizing economic and environmental goals provide 
potentially fertile source material for designing international cooperation 
on forest preservation. In this article, I consider the LCGGFA as potentially 
transplantable model legislation and as a partial basis for advancing 
international cooperation on discrete carbon emissions-mitigation projects, 
especially as related to the initiative Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (“REDD”).17) The article briefly 
14) Green growth is often compared and contrasted to sustainable development, an 
international law concept counseling in favor of balanced economic, environmental, and 
social equity considerations in policy-making; one common criticism of the LCGGFA is that it 
captures the economic and environmental prongs of sustainable development, but fails to 
reflect the social justice orientation embedded within sustainability theory. Mun Sang-Deok, 
Noksaekseongjanggibonbeope Gwanhan Hwankyeongbeopjeok Geomto [A Study on Green Growth Act 
from the Point of View of Environmental Law], 31 hwangyEongbEoPyEongu 1 [Envtl. l. stud] 15, 
37–38 (2009); Hahm Tae-Seong, ‘Noksaekseongjang’gua ‘Jisokganeungbaljeon’ui Gwangyejeongripe 
Gwanhan Beopjeokgochal [A Legal Study on the Relationship between ‘Green Growth’ and 
‘Sustainable Development’] 31 hwangyEongbEoPyEongu 1 [Envtl. l. stud] 355, 375–76 (2009). I 
note several key points of comparison between the two concepts, in theory and in practice, 
infra Sec. III.C.
15) The green growth vision was outlined in a policy address delivered by President Lee 
on August 15, 2008, the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Korean republic. For a 
discussion, see Lee Maan-ee, Korea Needs to Change Development Paradigm, KoREa timEs, Feb. 12, 
2009, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2011/04/270_39450.
html.
16) Act No. 9931, Jan. 13, 2010.
17) REDD is an international initiative that promotes the reduction of deforestation in 
nations throughout the world, with a particular emphasis on the tropical rainforest regions 
that contain high concentrations of sequestered carbon in the organic matter of the forest. See 
generally http://www.un-redd.org/; Zarin, supra note 6. In this article, I discuss the 
relationship of Korean green growth policy to aforestation and reforestation programs 
generally, while recognizing that multinational implementation of forest conservation projects 
would likely utilize existing REDD and REDD+ institutional channels.
 The Expansive Canopy of Korean Green Growth   |  175No. 2: 2011
sketches the general parameters of the greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emission18) 
and climate change issue, as well as an overview of major international 
forums and promulgations related to climate change mitigation efforts. I 
then provide background on Korea’s engagement with this issue, with a 
focus on the LCGGFA. The article then describes key international 
applications of this legislation and its potential role in advancing REDD 
and REDD+19) legal and political infrastructure in Southeast Asia. I hope 
that this article can usefully contribute to discussion of the international 
context and relevance of the green growth paradigm and its potential 
impact on forest conservation.
II. International Law Context
Environmental challenges are global in character and present distinct 
problems of incentivizing separate and collective actions by public and 
private parties. In this section, I briefly describe the nature of these 
challenges before focusing on existing international efforts to harmonize 
and implement environmental law standards. These efforts face 
considerable practical and administrative burdens, but are catalyzed by the 
potential enormity of environmental risks and an arguably weighty 
obligation to account for the future costs of present environmental policy-
related actions.20) International forums for negotiation have been 
18) GHG emission analyses often focus upon carbon dioxide as the predominant GHG 
emission; however, other gases also incrementally contribute to the atmospheric chemistry 
that acts to trap more heat within the biosphere; such gases include methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride. These gases, along with 
CO2, are defined as GHG emissions in the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the “Kyoto Protocol”), UN Doc FCCC/
CP/1997/7/Add.1, Annex A (1997), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/
kpeng.html. In this article, I often focus upon carbon dioxide in particular, while seeking to 
recognize the collective importance of all GHG emissions in assessing and managing the 
anthropogenic contribution to climate patterns.
19) For a discussion of some of the complex implications of international REDD efforts, 
see Jacob Phelps et al., Does REDD+ Threaten to Recentralize Forest Governance?, 328 sci. 312, 
312–313 (2010), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/328/5976/312.full.
20) Compare Nicholas Stern, thE Economics of climatE changE: thE stERn REviEw (2007), 
with William Nordhaus, a QuEstion of balancE: wEighing thE oPtions on global waRming 
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consistently and widely engaged by almost all nations and many non-
governmental organizations, even though outcomes have thus far been 
limited and uneven.21) I focus upon the general emergence of “sustainable 
development” and specific efforts related to climate change mitigation as 
two of the dominant features of contemporary international environmental 
law. Both are also central to understanding the purpose and nature of 
Korea’s green growth strategy.
1. Global Environmental Challenges
Amongst the environmental challenges facing the societies of the world, 
climate change, destruction of habitat and reduction of biodiversity,22) 
ozone depletion, and natural resource management all have significant 
global impacts.23) Loss of environmental resources, including biodiversity 
and depletion of finite resource deposits, may affect proximately located 
societies most immediately, but the consequences are not constrained by 
political borders. The climate-related impacts of GHG emissions and the 
depletion of ozone have a directly global impact. Although GHG emissions 
and emissions of ozone-destroying substances originate in a particular 
geographic location, once released they alter the chemistry of the entire 
planet’s atmosphere. The accumulation of all the relevant emissions in the 
world collectively affects the atmospheric concentrations of each GHG.24)
PoliciEs (2008). See also Dave Wright, thE clEan dEvEloPmEnt mEchanism 4–5 (2007).
21) Wide participation in climate change mitigation negotiations may, in fact, be a source 
of bargaining inefficiency. See Robert Stavins, Opportunities and Ironies: Climate Policy in Tokyo, 
Seoul, Brussels, and Washington, bElfER cEntER, Mar. 21, 2010, available at http://belfercenter.
ksg.harvard.edu/analysis/stavins/?p=568.
22) While the impacts of biodiversity loss may be less obviously of a shared and global 
character, the elimination of a feature or component of the natural world and the resultant 
qualitative injury to ecological richness is not a harm necessarily limited by geopolitical 
boundaries. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the 
European Union and the International Community, 83 va. l. REv. 1331, 1344 (1997).
23) See Jonathan B. Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal 
Context, yalE l. J. 677, 690–91 (1999) (discussing the “global public good” of minimizing 
externalities with an uncontainably international character).
24) Such consequences themselves are different and distinct in particular locations at 
particular points in time, but not in a manner systematically related to the location of GHG 
emission activities. The most dramatic illustration may be Antarctica, where almost no GHG 
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The difficulty of comprehensively containing environmentally 
detrimental activities is great, especially where impacts have no 
boundaries, but socially orchestrated responses are impacted and often 
constrained by jurisdiction-specific considerations.25) In the face of inaction 
and even obstruction by various sovereign participants in climate change 
negotiations, explanations range from skepticism of climate change science 
by citizen populations26) to notions that some nations expect to be, at least 
from a comparative standpoint, “climate change winners.”27)  
A particular concern that frustrates specific action on climate change is 
“leakage,” the potential problem that prevention or mitigation of harm in 
emissions originate, yet where dramatic changes in average temperature and climate patterns 
have occurred across the continent. For instance, in the Western Antarctic Peninsula, the 
average temperature has increased 10.8 degrees Fahrenheit (6 degrees Celsius) in the last 50 
years. Andy Isaacson, In Changing Antarctica, Some Penguins Thrive as Others Suffer, n.y. timEs 
(May 9, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/science/10penguins.html?_
r=1&scp=2&sq=antarctica&st=cse.
25) To utilize concepts for understanding the general nature of the problem, harm 
reduction as a global public good (where the interests of a particular sovereign state within 
which harmful externalities are reduced receives only a fraction of the benefit, which is 
roughly shared by all parties in the world) gives rise to a collective action problem, where the 
benefits of free-riding or other “defection” from mutual commitments creates a perverse 
incentive for all individual parties to engage in as little sacrifice as possible, or even none at 
all. 
26) In nations where a significant proportion of the citizenry do not accept the idea that 
human behavior impacts climate patterns, and where others do not support the modification 
or development of policy to address or counteract such effects, supporters of mitigation 
strategies are compelled to craft justifications that can account for popular opposition and can 
manage to resist majoritarian-inspired reversal of such policies through time. In one example 
quite relevant for international climate change negotiations, popular concern about the risk of 
climate change has been volatile in the United States and, as of late, appears to be waning. See 
Americans cooling on climate change, survey says, CNN, Jan. 27, 2010, available at http://articles.
cnn.com/2010-01-27/world/climate.report.america.trust_1_climate-change-climate-skeptics-
climate-leaders?_s=PM:WORLD (citing a Yale University and George Mason University 
survey that found “[f]ifty-seven percent of Americans polled at the end of 2009 and early 2010 
believe climate change is happening compared with a figure of 71 percent in October 2008”).
27) Some nations may believe that they stand to gain from the implications of climate 
change, or at least to suffer a lesser detriment than other countries. That some nations are 
particularly vulnerable and would suffer incomparably greater short-term consequences is 
evident. The Maldives, for instance, faces the risk that much of the island nation will be 
submerged due to rising sea levels. John H. Knox, Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at 
the United Nations, 33 haRv. Envt’l. l. REv. 477, 479–484 (2009).
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one location may simply give rise to a collateral and equivalent harm in 
another location.28) In the context of carbon emissions from deforestation, 
the prevention of forest destruction in one locale might result in 
deforestation activities elsewhere, counteracting part or all of the perceived 
ecological and net emissions-reduction benefit. Protection of a particular 
area of forest may simply cause parties engaged in deforestation to relocate 
to an area where forest preservation policies are not enforced or are not 
subject to attentive monitoring and meaningful law enforcement. In such a 
case, net deforestation activities have not been reduced (or have been 
reduced to a lesser extent than first appearances suggest); the site of the 
deforestation has merely shifted.
While international efforts to negotiate a binding and comprehensive 
structure for mitigation of GHG emissions and adaptation to climate 
change impacts continue, the challenges of formulating international 
agreement and cooperating on meaningful implementation are 
multifaceted and complex. Currently, the only purportedly binding treaty 
obligations in place arise under the Kyoto Protocol (which only defines 
binding carbon emission levels for the European Union, the United States 
and Japan, and the United States refused to ratify the document).29) Under 
the circumstances, there is both need and opportunity for creativity in the 
domestic policies of individual nations and multilateral cooperation 
between nations. Innovative policymaking on these levels would ideally 
provide incremental contributions to the process of climate change 
mitigation, construct actuated mechanisms for collaboration and policy 
implementation which could be adapted or generalized for broader 
utilization in future international efforts, and establish for the nations 
involved an advantageous “first mover” position in emerging “green 
28) One inexorable fact of environmental protection and climate change mitigation 
policies is that they require mutual support and adherence through time; international 
agreements are difficult to reach and easily broken. For a discussion of the frailty of the Kyoto 
Protocol, see, e.g., Heike Schroeder, The History of International Climate Change Politics: Three 
Decades of Progress, Process and Procrastination, thE Politics of climatE changE (Maxwell 
Boykoff, ed.) 26, 30–38 (2010).
29) Kyoto Protocol, supra note 19, at Annex B; United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_
protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php.
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industries” and markets.30) Before elaborating upon Korea’s primary 
legislative effort to craft a domestic green economy policy to pursue these 
objectives, we first consider the two main areas of international law that 
have emerged in response to environmental and economic challenges: the 
ubiquitous theme of “sustainable development” in international law and 
policy, and international efforts to date to mitigate anthropogenic 
contributions to climate change.
2. International Legal Response
1) Developing Sustainable Development
Sustainable development has long been a touchstone concept31) of 
international economics, environmental policy, and political science.32)  It 
guides policymakers to account for the “3E” elements (economy, 
environment, and social equity) and advances a vision of implementing this 
balance of objectives at jurisdictional levels ranging from local governments 
to global organizations.33) In the 2005 United Nations World Summit 
Outcome Document, it was stated that “sustainable development in its 
economic, social and environmental aspects constitutes a key element of the 
overarching framework of United Nations activities.”34) 
Sustainable development emerged through time as distinguishable 
from, and generally preferred by policymakers over, other environment-
30) For a discussion of competitive issues surrounding “green industries,” see Elisabeth 
Rosenthal, U.S. Is Falling Behind in the Business of ‘Green’, n.y. timEs, June 8, 2011.
31) The introduction of the sustainable development concept arguably dates back to 
several United Nations-related conferences and declarations of the early 1970s, such as the 
1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and the Stockholm Declaration 
on the Human Environment, UN Doc. A/C.48/14 (1972). See G. D. Meyers and S. C. Muller, 
The Ethical Implications, Political Ramifications, and Practical Limitations of Adopting Sustainable 
Development as National and International Policy, 4 buff. Envt’l l.J. 1, 2–3 (1996). 
32) Sustainable development was explicitly stated in United Nations promulgations as a 
foundational principle of ecological and economic policy in 1980. See World Conservation 
Strategy of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, UNGA Res. 7, UN GAOR 36th 
Sess., Supp. No. 51, UN Doc. A/51 (1982).
33) See Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, in REPoRt of thE woRld summit 
on sustainablE dEvEloPmEnt, Johannesburg, South Africa, A/CONF.199/20, United Nations 
(2002). 
34) United Nations, 2005 woRld summit outcomE, A/Res/60/1, p. 2.
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related principles, such as the pre-existing “deep ecology” and 
“environmental justice” concepts.35) However, significant questions exist 
over whether a more precise definition of sustainable development can 
gain international consensus.36) Experts also disagree over whether such a 
definition is necessary to promote the underlying objectives of sustainable 
development.37) In practice, sustainable development continues to be 
deployed as a foundational concept. Some proponents favor the concept’s 
broadness, believing that definitional agreement is only possible at this 
level of generality.38)
Attempts to provide a more precise meaning of sustainable 
development, in theory and in practice, have also been fraught with 
disagreement. Experts debate whether applications of the sustainable 
development concept place too much emphasis on foreseeable 
enhancements in the economic development of each society, and whether 
the concept can be utilized to broadly delineate the manner by which 
economic and environmental objectives are to be balanced. Varying 
explications of sustainable development, for instance, have been modified 
as “ecological sustainable development” and as “economic sustainable 
35) See J.B. Ruhl, The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: 
Cooperation, then Competition, then Conflict, 9 duKE Envtl. l. & Pol’y f. 161 (1999).
36) See, e.g., P.R. Berke and M. Conroy, Are We Planning for Sustainable Development?, 66 J. 
amER. Planning assoc. 21 (2000).
37) See Meyers and Muller, supra note 31, at 3–15. Meyers and Muller argue for a more 
“concrete” definition of sustainable development and propose the following: “development 
which either improves, maintains, or does not materially interfere with the ecological 
structure and functions of the [geographic] area in which such development takes place.” Id. 
at 15. As a first critical observation, I would assert that in a world with fewer economic and 
social barriers and no effective boundaries for containing environmental impacts, this 
definition should not limit its scope to interfering impacts only within the immediate 
geographic area of particular development. Further, from the standpoint of the diplomatic 
and other geopolitical implications of activities with observable and known ecological 
consequences, “sustainability” as a matter of international relations assumes an inter-
jurisdictional dimension.
38) Such a view holds that sustainable development should be promoted as a universal 
principle, even if consensus is currently only possible for a broad understanding of the 
concept. On the other hand, it can be argued that consensus is not legally or socio-politically 
meaningful without agreement about substantive meaning and at least some policy 
implications of sustainable development.
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development.”39) The former indicates that ecosystems are to be sustained, 
or at least that the human impact upon the dynamic state of ecosystems 
should as a first matter be minimized. The latter reaches environmental 
protection (and minimization of human impact upon the environment) 
derivatively, because environment is an instrumentality of continuous 
economic growth. 
2) Climate Change Law
Climate change and GHG mitigation policies illustrate the relationship 
between environmental and economic objectives as applied to law. Under 
an explicitly economic orientation, GHG emissions are mitigated because 
the estimated costs that climate change will inflict upon societies outweigh 
the present costs of mitigation.40) Even if degradation or other 
transformation of ecosystems due to climate change were not counted as a 
relevant cost, mitigation of carbon emissions may nonetheless reduce the 
anthropogenic impact upon natural ecosystems. The inclusion of these 
impacts in the cost-benefit analysis, however, may in some actual cases 
have an important effect on analytical outcomes and the policies that are 
enacted based upon them.41) Key choices, such as what impacts to include 
as costs and at what rate to discount future costs, are essential 
considerations.42) The following briefly summarizes major international 
events and agreements related to climate change mitigation strategies and 
39) Compare World Commission on Environment and Development, ouR common futuRE 
308 (1987) (asserting that “human survival…could depend on success in elevating sustainable 
development to a global ethics”), with Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the Royal Society (Sept. 
27, 1988) (stating that “[s]table prosperity can be achieved throughout the world provided the 
environment is nurtured and safe guarded”).
40) The analysis of costs is vitally impacted by the choice of discount rate for future 
benefits and harms. Two competing visions of climate change mitigation policies, for instance, 
have been advanced and distinguished on the basis of differing views of discount rate. See 
Stern, supra note 20 (advocating for a low discount rate as consistent with the “precautionary 
principle); Nordhaus, supra note 20 (defending a higher discount rate). See generally David 
Weibach and Cass Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 27 yalE l. & Pol’y REv. 433 (2009).
41) On the level of underlying principles and values, these decisions also weigh heavily 
upon the extent to which inter-generational justice and social sustainability are emphasized, 
although these concepts may not be interpreted to support any single outcome.
42) See Weibach & Sunstein, supra note 40.
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commitments, with an emphasis on those aspects of the international 
process most essential to understanding Korea’s present situation and the 
role of forest-related projects in the broader framework of managing GHG 
emissions.
Evidence of the rising concentrations of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere has been collected continuously since the 1950s as part of a 
United States research initiative in Hawaii.43) Prior to the drafting and 
ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (the “UNFCCC”) in 1992, several conferences raised international 
awareness of climatological change and concern that anthropogenic factors 
were contributing to potentially harmful alterations of climate patterns 
around the world.44) The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994,45) and it has to 
date been signed by 192 nations and the European Economic Community, 
amounting to almost universal membership in the treaty.46) The stated goal 
of the UNFCCC is to achieve “stabilization of GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”47) 
The UNFCCC did not establish binding obligations for signatory 
nations, but stated the general aspiration that developed nations would 
43) Schroeder, supra note 28, at 26–27.
44) Such conferences included two World Climate Conferences, in 1979 and 1990. M. 
Patterson, Global Warming and Global Politics 26-34 (1996). The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”) was established in 1988 under the auspices of the United Nations 
Environmental Programme in conjunction with the World Meteorological Organization. See 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch/. The creation of the IPCC 
was, at least in part, an effort to structure scientific efforts and to channel applications of 
science to policy within the ambit of a state-directed (and arguably a political) process; 
however, conflicts have frequently surfaced as the implications of the IPCC’s function of 
presenting “scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant for the 
understanding of human induced climate change, potential impacts of climate change and 
options for mitigation and adaptation” (http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/
publications_and_data.shtml#1) have diverged from policy preferences of many nations. See 
Chukwumerije Okereke, The Politics of Interstate Climate Negotiations, in thE Politics of climatE 
changE (Maxwell Boykoff, ed.) 42, 43–44 (2010).
45) Under the terms of the UNFCCC, it entered into force following ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession by 50 nations. Art. 23(1).
46) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratification, http://
unfccc.int/files/na/application/pdf/unfccc_ratification_20090826.pdf.
47) UNFCCC, art. 2.
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reduce their GHG emissions to 1990 levels.48) Without specifying the 
substantive content of policies designed to achieve emissions reductions 
and stabilization or other benchmarked goals, the text established processes 
and mechanisms by which future agreement could be advanced. Under the 
UNFCCC, a Conference of the Parties (“COP”) is held periodically to 
review existing measures taken in response to the UNFCCC and to provide 
a forum for expanding and concretizing international climate change 
commitments.49) Since 1995, a COP has been convened at least once 
annually (and with the exception of two conferences in 2001, exactly once 
annually). Of particular note are COP 3, which gave rise to the Kyoto 
Protocol; COP 13 in Bali; and the most recent conferences, COP 15 in 
Copenhagen and COP 16 in Cancun.
COP 3 in Kyoto developed the Kyoto Protocol, which articulated an 
overall objective of reducing GHG emissions by 5% relative to 1990 
emissions in the commitment period of 2008 through 2012.50) The Kyoto 
Protocol established specific national targets relative to the benchmark of 
1990 emissions, with binding reductions for the European Union (8%), the 
United States (7%), and Japan (6%).51) The Kyoto Protocol identified three 
special mechanisms for advancing climate change mitigation efforts: 
emissions trading, the clean development mechanism (the “CDM”), and 
joint implementation. Joint implementation embraced the existing notion in 
international environmental law that developed countries undertaking 
affirmative obligations can coordinate efforts to seek the most cost-effective 
means of inter-jurisdictionally mitigating emissions.52) The CDM extended 
this approach to collaborative efforts between developed and developing 
nations, a highly meaningful step because it empowered nations to pursue 
the particular cost effectiveness possible through the efficient transfer of 
technologies to, and investment in, nations that have significant potential 
for mitigation but lack the pre-existing infrastructure or economic 
incentives to realize such mitigations without external assistance and 
48) Id. art. 4.
49) Id. art. 7.
50) Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18, art. 25(1).
51) Id. at Annex B.
52) Schroeder, supra note 28, at 33.
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inducement.
For its numerous innovations, the Kyoto Protocol sought to impose 
reduction obligations on only three political entities. One of them, the U.S., 
declined to ratify the document, citing its lack of affirmative obligations for 
other nations.53) Furthermore, serious questions exist about whether the EU 
has seriously advanced a carbon mitigation agenda, even in light of its 
existing emissions trading system.54) Kyoto’s frailty has many contributing 
factors. In general, one arguable source of the lack of robustness of the 
Kyoto Protocol was perceived procedural inadequacies throughout 
negotiation and drafting, such as lack of participation and consent from all 
stakeholders, absence of agreed criteria for assigning obligations, and the 
ultimate exclusion of many nations, including emerging developed nations 
such as Korea and many of the largest carbon emitters, conspicuously 
China, from affirmative obligations to mitigate emissions. 
By the time of COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia,55) attention had shifted to 
devising a “post-Kyoto” international regime that could secure broader 
participation and compliance and yield deeper emission reductions. The 
conference produced the “Bali Road Map.”56) The Bali Road Map delineated 
a two-year plan which was to culminate in the creation of a binding 
international climate change program by COP 15 in 2009,57) to take effect by 
2012, the end of the Kyoto Protocol commitment period. COP 13 is also 
remarkable for its explicit discussion, in Decision 2,58) of the benefits of 
53) Stated rationales included the assertion that the Kyoto Protocols goals were “arbitrary 
and ineffective in nature,” that “many countries of the world are completely exempted from 
the Protocol, such as China and India,” and that “the Protocol could have potentially 
significant repercussions for the global economy.”  United States Embassy Public Affairs 
Section, Fact Sheet: United States Policy on the Kyoto Protocol,  http://www.usembassy.at/en/
download/pdf/kyoto.pdf.
54) See, e.g., Malcolm Dowden, climatE changE & sustainablE dEvEloPmEnt 49–53 (2008).
55) See The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, http://unfccc.int/meetings/
cop_13/items/4049.php. 
56) The decisions and resolutions collectively constituting the Bali Road Map are available 
at http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/3597.php?such=j&volltext=/
CP.13#beg.
57) See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, Bali Action Plan, 
Decision 1, art. 2, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3.
58) Decision 2, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
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forest-related emission mitigation efforts. The Bali meetings marked an 
initial success for heavily forested countries in gaining open recognition of 
the ecological and economic value of forest conservation efforts. The 
language of Decision 2 focused upon the objectives of securing voluntary 
support for forest conservation by developed nations, including through 
technology transfer,59) as well as raising recognition of the benefit to 
forested nations of utilizing rainforest conservation as part of their 
sustainable development strategies.60) The Decision also referenced 
“positive incentives”61) without elaborating upon their exact form or the 
means of institutional implementation (such as through a CDM process of 
approval, assessment, and generation of carbon emission reduction credits, 
or “CERs”).
COP 15, hosted in Copenhagen, Denmark, did not produce the binding 
international agreement anticipated by the Bali Road Map. The contentious 
conference concluded with the negotiation of a political statement, the 
Copenhagen Accord, which was “noted” rather than “adopted” due to a 
lack of consensus.62) The Copenhagen Accord acknowledged the basic 
elements of concern about climate change, namely that continually rising 
GHG emissions will likely have a growing impact upon the world climate 
with detrimental consequences for human welfare.63) It called upon nations, 
particularly developed nations, to make voluntary pledges to reduce their 
carbon emissions by 2020.64) Korea, though not an “Annex I” nation under 
the Kyoto Protocol, has an existing pledge to reduce emissions by 30% 
docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=8.
59) Id. art. 2.
60) Id. art. 3–4.
61) See id. art. 11–12.
62) Opposition by a small number of nations prevented the Copenhagen Accord from 
being adopted under the UN consensus requirement. These nations included Bolivia, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Kuwait, and Venezuela.
63) Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen 
from 7 to 19 December 2009 (the “Copenhagen Accord”), FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010), 
art. 1-3, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
64) Updated information about national participation in the Copenhagen Accord and 
pledges to date are available at Who’s On Board With The Copenhagen Accord?, climatE action 
nEtwoRK, http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/policy/copenhagen-accord-commitments.
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below “business-as-usual” rates by 2020,65) indicating that Korea accepts 
that it has a more prominent international role in mitigation efforts, though 
not of a nature that would involve absolute stabilization or reduction of 
carbon emissions at this time.66)
The most recent Conference of the Parties was held in 2010 in Cancun, 
Mexico. COP 16 resulted in an adopted agreement.67) The principle terms of 
the agreement recommended that developed nations pledge to reduce 
emissions under the Copenhagen Accord; encouraged developing nations 
to plan to mitigate emissions in the future; proposed the creation of a $100 
billion “Green Climate Fund” to assist developing nations with 
implementation of environmentally friendly policies; and supported a 
second commitment phase for the Kyoto Protocol to succeed the end of the 
original commitment period in 2012.68) Some praised the outcome for 
containing constructive steps, such as the institution of a large fund to 
subsidize environmentally sound practices in the developing world.69) The 
agreement also signaled that, for the present time at least, efforts to 
construct a binding climate change agreement would focus upon 
modification and extension of the Kyoto Protocol, rather than a novel legal 
regime. Amongst the limitations of COP 16 was the lack of commitment by 
any parties to undertake binding emissions reductions, to finance the Green 
Climate Fund, or to clarify the continuing dispute over whether any or all 
developing nations should be included in the affirmative obligations in a 
post-2012 carbon mitigation agreement.
65) Randall S. Jones and Byungseo Yoo, Korea’s Green Growth Strategy: Mitigating Climate 
Change and Developing New Growth Engines, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 
798 (2010), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kmbhk4gh1ns-en.
66) Korea’s commitment amounts to a pledge to reduce the rate of increase of carbon 
emissions during the next decade.
67) Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 
29 November to 10 December 2010 (the “Cancun Agreements”), FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 
(2011), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2.
68) Id. Sec. III.
69) See, e.g., Robert Stavins, Why Cancun trumped Copenhagen: Warmer relations on rising 
temperatures, thE chRistian sci. monitoR, Dec. 20, 2010.
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III. Korean Green Growth
To provide background and context for the LCGGFA, I first describe 
Korea’s economic status and pre-existing role in international 
environmental law action plans. I then identify central features of the Act 
and analyze them in the context of Korean law and in the broader scope of 
international law. Of special note is the highly debated relationship 
between green growth and sustainable development. This section 
concludes with a discussion of opportunities arising from the LCGGFA, as 
well as related obstacles that may frustrate and obfuscate the Act’s stated 
purposes.
1. Korean Situation
At the time of COP 3 in 1997, Korea was an ascendant economy but it 
argued that it lacked the stable and advanced state of economic 
development to commit to emission reductions. Ultimately, Korea was not 
included as an Annex I nation, so it did not undertake any firm 
commitments related to the mitigation of GHG emissions.70) The Kyoto 
Protocol’s limited success in effectuating policy changes has been attributed 
to many factors, including the lack of ultimate participation by the United 
States,71) as well as the failure to constrain heavy carbon-emitting 
70) As discussed supra, only emissions reductions for the EU, the United States, and Japan 
were stated as binding commitments under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, and only Annex I 
nations had stated reduction targets.
71) Due to significant decreases in American CO2 emissions from 2008 to 2009, total U.S. 
emissions in the calendar year 2009 were the lowest since 1995. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2011 U.S. GHG Inventory Report, USEPA #430-R-11-005, available at http://epa.gov/
climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport.html. Decreases in 2009 were due in significant 
part due to decreased energy demand and consumption as a consequence of economic 
recession, raising the question of whether reductions have continued and will continue, and 
whether current U.S. policy contains insight into constraining GHG emissions independent of 
patterns of economic production and consumption. Id.; see also U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, U.S. Carbon Dioxide emissions in 2009: A Retrospective Review, May 5, 2010, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/environment/emissions/carbon/. It is the stated philosophy 
of Korean green growth that economic growth and improved environmental protection 
measures (including the reduction of carbon emissions) are potentially synergistic objectives. 
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developing economies. For instance, China, a party with no obligations 
under the Kyoto Protocol, is now the largest carbon dioxide-emitting nation 
in the world.72) Korea’s economic prosperity has continued since the 1990s, 
and the nation is currently approximately the fifteenth-largest economy by 
GDP73) and the ninth-largest74) carbon emitter.75) Due to the lack of revision 
to the Kyoto Protocol or the creation of a new legal regime, Korea retains its 
formal status as a non-Annex I nation. However, in any new binding 
framework, Korea would presumably undertake obligations, even if such a 
framework continued to exclude at least some developing economies from 
defined limitations on their emissions.76)  Taking as possible bases 
(separately or collectively) for climate obligations historic responsibility for 
emissions, current total emissions, future projected emissions, or per capita 
emissions,77) Korea’s significant present emissions, continuing rate of 
emissions, and high carbon intensity all counsel in favor of a greater 
position of responsibility for Korea in international climate change 
See Jisoon Lee, supra note 12, at 34–36 (defining green growth as “economic growth and 
economic progress at the same time” and raising the possibility of building “environmental 
capital” as part of green growth policy).
72) China has been the single largest carbon-emitting nation since 2006, surpassing the 
emission level of the United States more than a decade earlier than projections had previously 
anticipated. Mark Levine and Nathaniel Aden, Global Carbon Emissions in the Coming Decades: 
The Case of China, 33 annual REv. of EnviR. & REs. 19, 20 (2008), available at http://www.
annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.environ.33.012507.172124; see also  China now 
no. 1 in CO2 emissions; USA in second position, PBL nEthERlands EnviRonmEntal assEssmEnt 
agEncy, http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2 
emissionsUSAinsecondposition.
73) World Economic Outlook Database, intERnational monEtaRy fund, http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx.
74) See Millennium Development Goals Indicators, Carbon dioxide emissions (CO2), thousand 
metric tons of CO2 (CDIAC), http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=749& 
crid=.
75) Korea is a relatively “carbon-intense” economy, meaning that its carbon emissions per 
unit of GDP are relatively large.
76) The rationale for such exclusion is that certain nations are not yet economically stable 
enough or able to generate enough prosperity for the members of the society to achieve a 
humane standard of living. Such logic no longer seems appropriate as a basis for excluding 
Korea from the scope of nations assuming restrictive obligations.
77) See Xueman Wang, Sustainable International Climate Change Law, in sustainablE 
dEvEloPmEnt law, 350, 353–55 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and Ashfaq Khalfan, eds. 
2004).
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mitigation efforts.
Furthermore, Korea’s potential significance in international negotiations 
and plans of action may be greater than just as a stakeholder and domestic 
obligation-enforcer. Korea is uniquely situated in a “bridge” position 
between developing and developed nations. One of only two nations to 
transition from charter membership in the G77 to membership in the 
OECD, Korea is a G20 nation and has realized a sustained and dramatic 
growth trajectory that has catapulted the nation from total lack of 
development to wealth and global prominence in approximately 50 years.78) 
In many respects, Korea occupies the status of a developed nation: an aid-
provider, capable security ally to the United States, and responsible 
stakeholder in a variety of international and intergovernmental institutions. 
Korea possesses considerable material and infrastructural resources, but 
also an awareness of the essential nature of sustained economic growth for 
developing nations. Given Korea’s impressive developmental trajectory 
and awareness of the challenges of balancing economic gains with other 
social goals and international responsibilities, Korea may serve as a 
relevant and useful model for the conceptualization of “green growth” 
related policies in developing nations.
Building upon the original work regarding green growth at a United 
Nations event in Seoul in 2005,79) the green growth policy direction was 
proclaimed by President Lee in 2008, a vision that was generally outlined in 
a speech in August of 2008.80) Under the terms of the specified five-year 
plan (2008-2013), Korea will devote at least two percent of its annual GDP 
to environment-friendly economic development and progress towards the 
longer-term objective of reducing its nationwide carbon emissions by 30% 
78) See Jisoon Lee, supra note 12, at 23–26.
79) The conference was jointly hosted by Korea’s Ministry of Environment and the United 
Nations. See United Nations Environment Programme, ovERviEw of thE REPublic of KoREa’s 
national stRatEgy foR gREEn gRowth, note 2 (2010). 
80) President Lee stated, “Green growth refers to sustainable growth, which helps reduce 
GHG emissions and environmental pollution. It is also a new national development paradigm 
that creates new growth engines and jobs with green technology and clean energy.” Lee 
Maan-ee, supra note 15.
190 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 10: 171
below business-as-usual levels81) by 2020.82) When many nations 
appropriated funds for economic stimulus during the global economic 
downturn in 2008, Korea’s publicly financed spending and investment 
targeted sectors consistent with the green growth vision.83) Korea’s similar 
stimulus package allocated 84% for “green” investment; by comparison, 
36% of China’s stimulus spending was devoted to these areas, and the 
United States, 12%.84) Of particular note was the funding allocated for river 
“restoration,” accounting for nearly half of the stimulus funds.85) More 
comprehensive legal guidance, and a basic template for the future 
implications of green growth in Korean society, was provided through the 
drafting and promulgation of Korea’s fundamental law on green growth, 
the LCGGFA.
2. Key Features of the LCGGFA
A central tenet of the Kyoto Protocol, and international environmental 
law generally, is policy design and implementation flexibility for individual 
nations. One perspective on the LCGGFA is that it represents Korea’s most 
concrete and aggressive step thus far in advancing its domestic vision of 
how to fulfill its own and international aspirations of improved environ-
81) Business-as-usual (“BAU”) indicates the rate of carbon emissions that would be 
produced at a particular point in time, under the most accurate economic projections, in the 
absence of any deliberate policy mechanisms in place to reduce those emissions. See Hoffert et 
al., Energy implications of future stabilization of atmospheric CO2 content, 395 natuRE 881, 882 
(1998) (defining BAU as the “baseline scenario” for future carbon emissions based upon 
consensus estimates of population change, economic development, and energy technology in 
the absence of new government policy related to climate change).
82) See Randall S. Jones and Byungseo Yoo, Korea’s Green Growth Strategy: Mitigating 
Climate Change and Developing New Growth Engines, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers, No. 798 (2010), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/kore-a-green-
growth-strategy_5kmbhk4gh1ns-en. 
83) Korea’s stimulus spending was presented as a “green new deal,” in reference to the 
notion of a “new deal” as a set of public investments and activities meant to invigorate the 
economy and transform the relationship between citizens and the state (in the case of Korea, 
with a more urgent emphasis on the former). See Lee Maan-ee, supra note 15.
84) World Bank, woRld dEvEloPmEnt REPoRt 2010 (2010).
85) See Dennis Normille, Restoration or Devastation?, 327 sci. 1568, 1568–70 (2010). This 
particular green growth-connected investment is analyzed in detail, infra Section III.
 The Expansive Canopy of Korean Green Growth   |  191No. 2: 2011
mental policy. As Korea’s defining legislation for its interpretation of 
international burdens and objectives, certain features are particularly 
notable and will directly influence the ultimate form and consequences of 
Korean environmental law. 
1) Themes and Principles
The Act provides explicit guidance in the areas of economic growth86) 
and conceptions of environmental responsibility87) to be promoted through 
the Act. Several characteristics of the LCGGFA are important in 
understanding the role of this legislation in Korean law and its present 
phase of implementation. The LCGGFA should be noted, firstly, for the 
characteristic of generality. It sets a broad agenda and indicates certain 
potential features of future laws and policies,88) but does not fully define or 
specifically enact substantive policies. The Act creates new executive 
bodies,89) imposes general “obligations,”90) and delegates power to the 
administrative state.91) In that sense, its positive enactments are largely 
procedural and administrative in nature, establishing a framework of 
interrelated actors with delegated powers to imbue substance into the 
green growth concept. However, although the Act is general in terms of 
legal duties and powers, it specifically identifies topics that are to be 
addressed.92)
The Act seeks to establish a framework of duties, including regulatory 
obligations and incentivized voluntary behavior, for public and private 
institutions and individuals. Beyond the general emphasis on responsi-
86) See, e.g., LCGGFA, art. 22–35 (stating provisions relating to “green economy,” “green 
industries,” and “green technology”).
87) See, e.g., id. art. 38 (“Basic Principles for Coping with Climate Change”); art. 51 
(“Management of Green Homeland”); art. 55 (“Promotion of Environment-Friendly 
Agriculture and Fisheries and Expansion of Carbon Sinks”).
88) One prominent example is the Act’s discussion of the possibility of a cap-and-trade 
carbon emissions market. Id. art. 46.
89) See id. art. 14.
90) See, e.g., id. art. 7.
91) See, e.g., id. art. 3–4, 9.
92) The illustrations of such specific directions are numerous; one example is the article 
describing improvement of agricultural and fishery practices and the cultivation of carbon 
sinks. See id. art. 55.
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bilities for the national government,93) the Act includes local government 
responsibilities,94) business entity responsibilities,95) and responsibilities for 
citizens.96) In the Korean context, one might ask whether the force of 
popular will and desire for environmentally sound social transformation 
has created the basis for meaningful “citizen responsibilities” for each 
individual.97) The test of whether popular support for these measures exists 
will arise in the context of future lawmaking to create specific and binding 
obligations for the general public.
2) Major Provisions
(1) Implementation/Enforcement Measures and Related Government 
Bodies
The Act establishes a centralized structure of actors oriented around the 
key decision-maker, the Korean president (the “President”). The 
Presidential Committee, the executive power-wielding body for the Act, is 
“instituted under the control of the President.”98) The Presidential 
Committee’s functions are vast and include making key determinations of 
the basic direction of policies under the Act, the development and 
execution of the national green growth and climate change strategies, and 
supervision and support for administrative agencies as they participate in 
green growth implementation.99)  The national strategy for green growth, as 
received and deliberated upon by the Presidential Committee, is effectively 
developed at the discretion and under the control of the President and 
includes broad and comprehensive plans relating to the multifaceted 
concerns of the LCGGFA.100)  The head of each central administrative 
agency is responsible for establishing and implementing an “action plan” 
93) See, e.g., id. art. 3–4.
94) Id. art. 5.
95) Id. art. 6.
96) Id. art. 7.
97) For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the relationship between popular will 
and the enforcement of environmental law in Korea in general, see Hong Sik Cho, supra note 
13, at 47-64.
98) LCGGFA, art. 14(1).
99) Id. art. 15.
100) Id. art. 9.
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for that agency, pursuant and responsive to Presidential Decrees.101) 
Similarly, local government leaders can be instructed by Presidential 
Decree to advance and implement action plans for the local area in 
question.102)  In these matters, the President is situated at the focal point of 
policymaking and, through the influence he or she exerts on the 
composition and conduct of the Presidential Committee, the President 
possesses considerable power for managing green growth-related measures 
and initiatives.
(2) Measures Bearing on the “National Economy”103)
Consistent with the many connections between green growth policy 
and national economic policy, the Act contains many provisions that 
articulate general principles for the relationship between “green” and 
“growth,” and provides specific initiatives and policy directions. The 
executive is instructed to undertake a central role in “materializing green 
economy,” including by identifying and fostering what he or she considers 
to be promising industries,104) and by supervising entity management 
policy.105)  Further provisions instruct the government to manage and 
facilitate improvements in resource recycling.106) Numerous provisions 
relate to support for research and development and subsequent 
commercialization of green technology.107) The Act prescribes the 
government-facilitated establishment of “green finance” (measures to 
promote investment in key industries, development of useful financial 
instruments, and the establishment of a “liquid” carbon market).108) Tax 
101) Id. art. 10.
102) Id. art. 11.
103) Such measures are manifold. Id. art. 26 (Facilitation of Research, Development, and 
Commercialization of Green Technology), 28 (Support for and Boosting of Finance), 29 
(Establishment of and Support for Companies for Investment in Green Industries), 31 
(Support and Special Privileges for Green Technology and Green Industries), 32 
(Standardization and Certification of Green Technology and Green Industries), and 33 
(Support for Medium and Small Enterprises).
104) Id. art. 23.
105) Id. art. 25.
106) Id. art. 24.
107) Id. art. 26; art. 31–35.
108) Id. art. 28.
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policy is to be reformed in the direction of “green” objectives.109) In general, 
the character of these provisions is to provide the executive with broad 
discretion, theoretically limited by an abstract theme of cultivating efficient 
incentives, but with latitude to exercise regulatory power to stimulate the 
progress of “green industry.”
(3) Measures Bearing on “Climate Change”
Climate change lies at the heart of international environmental law 
negotiations and presents in sharp relief the challenge of achieving 
mutually reinforcing economic growth and environmental protection. The 
issue of climate change exists as part of the underlying purposive fabric of 
the Act, and is explicitly discussed in certain key provisions. The 
government is instructed to compose and implement successive five-year 
plans for coping with climate change, with the deliberation of the 
Presidential Committee and the State Council.110) Emission targets shall be 
set by sector and by individual “controlled entity” (enterprises that emit a 
certain amount of GHG).111) The government is to establish reporting and 
information management standards for emissions.112) Of considerable 
domestic and international interest is the language concerning a GHG 
emission cap-and-trade system (as the Act describes it, using “market 
functions”).113) The Act gives the government the discretion to create a 
carbon market, with the caveat that international developments will be 
considered in any move towards cap-and-trade.114) Finally, the research 
component of developing and refining climate change-related policies is 
addressed with the command to deepen and enhance the useful output of 
existing and future research.115) While this chapter of the Act is most 
commonly discussed in the context of a prospective “carbon market,” it 
advances a more immediate and relevant set of regulatory parameters 
related to the limitations that may be imposed upon “controlled entities.”
109) Id. art. 30.
110) Id. art. 40.
111) Id. art. 42.
112) Id. art. 44–45.
113) Id. art. 46; see also art. 28.
114) Id. art. 46(3).
115) Id. art. 48.
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3. Relationship Between Green Growth and Sustainable Development
The LCGGFA seeks to give putative meaning to the concept of 
“sustainable development.” The Act incorporates the definition of 
“sustainable development” from the Sustainable Development Act116): 
“development based on sustainabil i ty 117) that is implemented 
simultaneously in the pursuit of economic growth, social stability and 
integration, and the preservation of the environment.”118) 
As the law which succeeded and directly amended the Sustainable 
Development Act, the LCGGFA contains numerous provisions related to 
sustainable development. The LCGGFA states that sustainable 
development is heavily related to altering patterns of resource consumption 
and mitigating carbon emissions. The President is charged with preparing 
measures to address land management and efficient development, such as 
“carbon-neutral” and resource self-sufficient cities and “environment-
friendly” development.119) The executive branch is further charged with 
overseeing water management120) and the transportation network121) in a 
manner that both mitigates and adapts122) to climate change consequences. 
The President lies at the center of policy-making for design and efficiency 
standards to promote “green buildings”123) and is given the broad 
instruction to promote environment and energy-sustainable production 
and consumption choices by ensuring that the energy and emissions 
consequences of the provision of goods and services are “reasonably linked 
116) Act No. 8612, Aug. 3, 2007.
117) This definition is facially tautological, so I try to identify below the substantive 
content of sustainable development as it is applied in Korean law.
118) Id. art. 2(2).
119) LCCGFA, art. 51(2).
120) Id. art. 52.
121) Id. art. 53.
122) Considering the social dimension of sustainable development theory, adaptation 
takes on special significance, especially if one assumes that the most economically and socially 
vulnerable individuals would generally bear the heaviest burden of climate change impacts in 
the absence of effective anticipation and adaptation.
123) Id. art. 54.
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to and reflected in the price of goods and services.”124) The executive is 
charged with promotion of carbon sinks domestically through a variety of 
channels, including regulation of land use (forests, farmland), agriculture, 
and territorial sea waters.125) The discretion to provide developing countries 
with climate change-related “financial support”126) may have considerable 
application in the area of carbon sinks, such as aforestation and 
reforestation projects in the tropical regions of Southeast Asia.
At the most aspirational level, the LCGGFA asserts to fulfill the basic 
premise of sustainable development: building a foundation for policy-
making that reflects a full consideration and accommodation of 
environmental, economic, and social justice considerations. The provisions 
of the Act purport to enact a version of sustainable development by 
framing the context in which Korean development occurs and, ultimately, 
the physical and social environment in which individual Koreans live.127) 
These provisions have an evident balance of environmental and economic 
policy: they capture the intersections of environmental conservation128) and 
harm reduction129) with intermediate- and long-term economic planning. 
As Korean economists argue, sustaining and broadening the current 
base of Korean prosperity requires the utilization of emerging technology 
markets and a new transformation of the Korean economy.130) These 
provisions provide a template for the balancing and mutual satisfaction of 
environmental and economic objectives.131) Sustainable development 
124) Id. art. 57(2).
125) Id. art. 55.
126) Id. art. 61.
127) See generally id. art. 36 (stating that the government “shall endeavor to reduce social 
and economic expenses by inducing persons who cause the generation of GHG emissions or 
pollutants to voluntarily reduce the generation of GHG emissions and pollutants”); art. 7 
(stating individual duties to “practice green life” and “increase consumption and use of green 
products”).
128) The Act contains, for instance, provisions on the promotion of “eco-tourism” through 
preservation and restoration of ecosystems. Id. art. 56.
129) In example, consider provisions related to reduced energy consumption and lowered 
carbon emissions, ranging from design standards to a prospective cap-and-trade system for 
carbon emissions. Id. art. 42–47.
130) See Jisoon Lee, supra note 12, at 24–31.
131) As discussed supra, sustainability has been an embedded component of international 
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implies not just a dimension of conservation and custodianship, but also 
modification and adaptation. While sustainability contains a principle of 
maintaining certain conditions, minimum quantities or “critical masses” of 
natural resources,132) development is predicated upon change and 
conversion.133) Green growth seeks to give specific content and meaning to 
the general parameters of sustainable development, including through 
adaptation to changing environmental conditions.
4. Opportunities and Obstacles
The very features of the LCGGFA that define its potential for significant 
reform and legal, political, social and economic impact also underpin 
serious objections to the legislation itself. These features include its 
comprehensive scope, specific identification of policy goals and the areas of 
administrative and regulatory law that should be engaged to achieve them, 
and the central role of the Korean President, and by extension the executive 
power in general, in not just executing the legislation, but interpreting it. 
That its policy ramifications remain to be defined is arguably the central 
strength and also the greatest concern uncertainty surrounding the Act. I 
first elaborate upon the potentials for socially meaningful impact created by 
these features, before discussing the related objections that these features 
raise.
The LCGGFA presents a comprehensive framework that connects 
administratively disparate dimensions of bureaucratic function in the 
service of the unified policy objectives of the Act. The LCGGFA identifies a 
environmental law rhetoric for more than two decades. The ubiquity and generality of 
sustainable development reinforce the reality that it must be supplemented or, as the Act 
purports to do, integrated into an elaborated vision for policy implementations. Therefore, the 
objection that Korean green growth is inadequate on an international stage due to the 
established position of sustainable development is unavailing.
132) For discussions of maintenance of natural capital, see M. Roseland, Sustainable 
Community Development: Integrating Environmental, Economic, and Social Objectives, 54 PRogREss 
in Planning 73, 78 (2000); D. Pearce and R. K. Turner, Economics of natuRal REsouRcEs and 
thE EnviRonmEnt. 44 (1990).
133) See Kohn et al., sustainability in action: sEctoRal and REgional casE studiEs, 3 (2001) 
(considering the theoretical and practical challenges of maintaining particular features or 
quantities of elements within dynamic environmental systems through time).
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number of specific areas for targeted reforms and implementations; 
aforementioned examples include tax reform, maintenance of carbon sinks, 
and expanded international cooperation. Further, the legislation discusses a 
set of potential incentives that can be created to stimulate strategic and 
creative measures by private parties to advance economically and 
environmentally sound outcomes. The Act endorses several layers of 
quantity-related instruments, both through its entity regulation and, to 
more fully engage market logic, a potential cap-and-trade system. The 
choice of quantity over price instruments may displease those who prefer 
the price-based strategy of a carbon tax, but quantity instruments hold 
significant promise, especially in the eventual design of internationally 
cooperative approaches to emission mitigation.134) The considerable power 
and discretion vested in the executive can potentially provide the basis for 
efficient implementation and enforcement of specific green growth policies. 
The very characteristics that give rise to the potential robustness and 
impact of the LCGGFA are also the source of some of the most serious 
criticisms against it. The Act may be seen as too specific and complex, 
effectively trying to legislate solutions to specific contemporary problems 
for implementation in a dynamic future environment for which currently 
conceived policy mixes may be unconducive.135) Paradoxically, however, 
the very generality with which many of the Act’s provisions are framed 
poses the arguable problem that the legislation lacks a definitive vision for 
how to advance its stated purposes. Inasmuch as its legal obligations are 
largely aspirational, the question of enforcement remains indeterminate.136) 
Another general critique focuses on the degree of executive discretion, 
ultimately residing with the President, existing under the structures and 
134) See Wiener, supra note 23.
135) Complexity theory suggests that while specific causal interactions may be impossible 
to predict, the trends and character of such interactions are not, and that as applied to the 
administrative state, the theory counsels against highly “complex” and context-specific 
regulation. See generally J.B. Ruhl and Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law In Modern 
Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing 
Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 u.c. davis l. REv. 405 (1997).
136) For example, the LCGGFA states obligations for individual citizens to promote green 
growth principles, such as practicing “green life” and preferring the consumption of “green 
products.” LCGGFA, art. 7(1), (2).
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procedures created by the LCGGFA. The Act endorses a balance of power 
heavily delegated to the executive. Although this Act may make policy 
design and implementation adaptable through time, it embraces internal 
responsiveness and flexibility at the potential expense of broader 
connection and responsiveness to popular preference. Serious questions 
exist about how, if at all, specific green growth policy initiatives are 
connected to and legitimated by informed public support. Arguably, the 
earliest major illustration of green growth policy was implemented through 
a lengthy and expensive process that was and remains insensitive to public 
opinion. During his presidential campaign in 2007, current president Lee 
Myung-Bak advocated the creation of a “Pan Korea Grand Waterway” by 
connecting the Han and Nakdong rivers via a canal.137) Following 
considerable scholarly and public opposition, the canal proposal was 
abandoned. A new plan to modify an extensive network of Korean 
waterways based around four principal rivers, the Han, Nakdong, Geum, 
and Yeongsan, was advanced as a specific green growth-related initiative 
prior to the promulgation of the LCGGFA. The “Four Rivers Project” 
required an initial 22 trillion won allocation (the equivalent of more than 19 
billion USD) for its completion. Amongst other measures, the legislation 
calls for building 16 dams, deepening riverbeds through extensive 
dredging of more than 500 million cubic meters of sand and other riverbed 
material, and constructing a series of recreational accommodations along 
the waterways.138)  
The Four Rivers Project received early if qualified praise from some 
international bodies;139) the United Nations Environmental Programme 
(“UNEP”) referenced it in relation to important environment and economic 
activity-adaptation goals.140) However, to what extent the Four Rivers 
137) See John Sudworth, Canal plan divides Korea, bbc nEws, Jan. 23, 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7202161.stm.
138) See Normille, supra note 85, at 1568–70.
139) See Do Je-hae, Foreign NGOs Brings 4-Rivers Plan Positive Spin, KoREa timEs, Feb. 9, 
2010, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/02/113_60590.
html.
140) With reference to the Four Rivers Project, UNEP observed, “UNEP encourages the 
stepping up of investment in ecological restoration, to address this key ecological scarcity as 
well as to prepare effective and cheap adaptation strategies for the onset of climate change 
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Project would actually advance socially desired and desirable objectives, 
and with what collateral consequences, have been central questions of 
political and social debate.141) About 70% of the public have expressed the 
view that the Four Rivers Project should be canceled or at least 
suspended.142) Although this project has fueled a spirited debate within civil 
society,143) disputes and public resistance have not impeded the pace of 
project implementation.144) The Four Rivers Project is scheduled to be 
principally concluded in September of 2011;145) in the face of continuing 
opposition and criticism, President Lee is confident that the public will 
come to favor the Four Rivers Project after seeing the results.146)
Such attitudes, and the general Korean experience with the Four Rivers 
Project, cast doubt on Korean policy as “socially sustainable.”  Consistency 
reducing recurrent costs associated with periodic flooding.” United Nations Environment 
Programme, ovERviEw of thE REPublic of KoREa’s national stRatEgy foR gREEn gRowth 7 
(2010), available at http://hqweb.unep.org/PDF/PressReleases/201004_UNEP_NATIONAL_
STRATEGY.pdf. 
141) See Normille, supra note 85, at 1568–1570.
142) See Do Je-hae, supra note 139.
143) For instance, approximately 2,800 Korean scholars loosely organized in opposition to 
the canal project in the so-called Professors’ Organization for Movement Against Grand 
Korean Canal (“POMAC”) and expressed criticism of the Four Rivers Project. See Normille, 
supra note 85. In another example, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Korea issued 
statements criticizing the environmental impact and rapid implementation method of the 
Four Rivers Project, engaging a prominent dimension of Korean civic life, its organization 
through religious communities and hierarchies, in the social debate. See Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference of Korea announces opposition to Four Rivers project, thE hanKyoREh, Mar. 13, 2010, 
available at http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/409868.html.  While 
much domestic sentiment has resisted the Four Rivers Project, not all civil society 
involvement has been oriented towards opposition to the project, especially abroad. See Do 
Je-hae, supra note 139.
144) Construction has also continued in the face of considerable political debate and 
conflict with local government officials. See South Korea’s Four Rivers project: The dredgery must 
go on, Economist, Aug. 9, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2010/ 
08/south_koreas_four_rivers_project.
145) See Lee confident of river project’s success despite backlash, yonhaP nEws, Apr. 16, 2011, 
available at http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/04/16/94/0301000000AEN20110
416003800315F.HTML.
146) According to President Lee, “All [of the people] will accept [the project] if [they] see 
the scene after [the construction] is completed … There can be opposition to new things. But if 
[the government] does not carry out what it should do due to opposition, a country can’t 
develop.” Id.
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of legislative promulgations and executive actions with the expressed 
views of the public is an essential dimension of sustainability policy in a 
society based on democratic consensus. This is particularly the case for 
issues, such as the Four Rivers Project, which occupy a central place in 
public discourse and where the informed opinions of the electorate are 
clearly discernible. The supporters of the Four Rivers Project argue that this 
and other green growth policies will ultimately be accepted by the Korean 
people, even if this acceptance comes only after the fact. If public opinion 
does not change, however, one implication could be a loss of support for 
future policies advanced under the rubric of green growth, resistance 
undergirded by suspicion of the process by which initiatives such as the 
Four Rivers Project have been implemented thus far. 
It is premature to predict whether the positive or negative view of the 
central characteristics of the Act is the more incisive and prescient analysis 
of its implications for Korean law and policy. These variables should be 
carefully monitored, and the potential vulnerabilities of resultant laws and 
regulations carefully managed and mitigated, in order to promote the most 
efficient and socially sustainable results for Korean green growth.
IV. Green Growth and Transplantation
Green growth may be usefully introduced in other domestic systems or 
“internationalized” through multinational legal structures for two possible 
reasons. The first is that the insights found in green growth, in theory or as 
applied, would arguably be of benefit to other nations. The second 
possibility is that particular other countries may find it in their national 
interest to facilitate a particular relationship and “legal linkage” with Korea 
or other nations espousing and implementing green growth-related 
policies. The following analysis considers both of these possibilities through 
the general consideration of potential transplantation of Korean green 
growth abroad.
1. What is Transplantation?
The concept of “legal transplantation” as a means of analyzing changes 
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in legal systems was popularized by Professor Alan Watson,147) but the 
concept and analysis of its descriptive and analytical power date back 
further.148) Transplantation may be defined generally as the borrowings that 
happen between and amongst legal systems, ranging from the adoption of 
an entire legal system to the excerpted borrowings of particular laws and 
policies.149) Transplantation is of particularly vital importance in 
environmental legislation.150) Because of the global nature of environmental 
problems and the reality that solutions must engage vital participations 
from many nations,151) environment and international development are 
particularly well-suited to the harmonized benefits that deliberate and 
organized transplantation can accomplish.152)
The LCGGFA has several key features that could prove useful to the 
development of analogous legal frameworks in other nations. In general, 
the LCGGFA embraces and promotes incentive-based policy instruments, 
leaving considerable discretion and flexibility to regulated entities to 
pursue their best interests, but contextualizing their choices in a regulatory 
environment that rewards the efficient and incremental improvement of 
optimizing public goods and, even more evidently, minimizing public 
harms (especially when GHG emissions are viewed as “public harms”). In 
the continuous debate regarding the degree of domestic flexibility in 
achieving objectives,153) the LCGGFA offers a particularized version of how 
147) Alan Watson, lEgal tRansPlants: an aPPRoach to comPaRativE law, University of 
Georgia Press (1st ed. 1974).
148) According to the distinguished scholar and Harvard Law School Dean, Roscoe 
Pound, as quoted almost 100 years ago, the “history of a system of law is largely a history of 
borrowings of legal materials from other legal systems and of assimilation of materials from 
outside the law.”  Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: legal Transplants 
and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, Ecology L.Q. 1295, 1296 (2001).
149) See Alan Watson, supra note 147.
150) See generally Wiener, supra note 148.
151) See Wiener, supra note 23.
152) See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law: 
Foreword: Global Governance as Administration – National and Transnational Approaches to Global 
Administrative Law, 68 law & contEmP. PRob. 1 (2005).
153) The negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, for instance, was fraught with conflict on this 
point, with the United States (and, to a less emphatic extent, Japan) arguing for maximum 
domestic flexibility in emissions-relevant domestic lawmaking, and with the EU advocating 
more structure and particularized commitments within the agreement itself. See Schroeder, 
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domestic lawmaking can produce a diverse bundle of policy initiatives. The 
green growth model, embodying the notion of flexibility in elaborated 
statutory structure, may serve as a useful if general template for other 
nations. The Act is ambitious in its broad scope of applicability, 
incorporating many departments and functions of the existing bureaucratic 
order while re-imagining the very relationship between administrative 
departments, and between the state and the individual.154) Although the 
dramatic sweep of such provisions as obligations for individual citizens 
may hardly be generalizable, and should be the source of considerable 
debate about personal freedom of action and construction of individual 
choice environments by the government, the fundamental issues raised by 
the LCGGFA are questions that other societies should consider in their 
public policy discourse. Finally, and more concretely, provisions providing 
for carbon credits for Korean entities achieving foreign-based carbon 
emissions reductions,155) prospectively within the context of a nationwide or 
multinational cap-and-trade system, represent a move in the direction of 
quantity-based market regulation of carbon emissions. Quantity-based 
market instruments have been utilized in only a fragmented manner thus 
far, but lie at the center of anticipated future developments for efficient and 
globally integrated carbon management.
Can the Korean green growth legal framework be usefully transplanted, 
in whole or in part, to the domestic legal systems of other nations? The 
distinctive aspects analyzed supra are relevant to answer this question. The 
Korean approach is particularly well-suited to a nation with a preference 
and capacity for policies that encompass a broad set of environmental 
goals, including but not limited to the mitigation of GHG emissions. The 
framework approach is appropriate for nations that have the political and 
social capacity to proceed with green growth policies on an initially 
domestic scale, with potential bilateral and multilateral projects in the 
supra note 28, at 31–32.
154) See, e.g., LCGGFA, art. 7.
155) Examples of projects include alternative energy, such as biomass/biogas, wind, and 
hydropower; energy efficiency initiatives; and carbon sequestration and the optimization of 
carbon sinks. The potential to achieve these forms of resource consumption efficiency abroad 
represent the most instantly relevant application of the LCGGFA for other nations, especially 
developing nations with whom Korea could cultivate mutually beneficial partnerships.
204 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 10: 171
future. Nations insisting upon broad international consensus and 
commitment as a condition precedent to adopting “green” policies may not 
benefit from the Korean approach. Further, developing nations may find 
Korean green growth more suitable and attractive than developed nations. 
For developing nations, green growth legislation holds the particular 
potential of enabling cooperation with Korea and Korean entities, such as 
CDM or similar multinational joint efforts. For developed nations, the 
appeal of cooperation with Korea is less evident, and Korean-style green 
growth legislation may be redundant with many currently implemented 
policies.
Particular similarities that would promote transplantability include: a 
strong central policymaker (similar to the President) who can utilize the 
general framework and coordinate the efforts of regulatory bodies to enact 
concrete green growth-related policies; an openly acknowledged national 
goal to enhance stature in the international community; and a desire to 
facilitate cooperation with other nations implementing similar legislation, 
including (but not limited to) Korea.
In predicting the potential for the Act and its subsequent elaboration in 
further Korean law and policy to impact the legal frameworks adopted and 
implemented in other nations, one central and readily transplantable idea is 
the direct inclusion of mechanisms for linkage with domestic laws of other 
nations, and with international market mechanisms.156) Some of the other 
general principles may also find a relatively broad audience. Of particular 
note are the heavy emphasis on incentive-based instruments157) and the 
cultivation of broad and inclusive incentive structures that create a 
decision-making environment for entities and individuals that rewards 
choices seen as reinforcing specific green growth objectives. Actual 
156) For a discussion of the potential of the LCGGFA to establish linkages with 
international market mechanisms, see Jae-Hyup Lee, Noksaekseongjanggibonbeopui 
Chinhwangyeongjeok Silhyeonul Yuhan Beopjeok Sudan – Gihubyeonhwadaeeung Sijangjeok 
Mechanismeul Jungsimeuro [Legal Measures to Fulfill Eco-friendly Implementation of the Proposed 
Basic Law on Green Growth: Market Mechanisms for Responding to Climate Change], 31 
hwangyEongbEoPyEongu 1 [Envtl. l. stud] 39, 61 (2009).
157) For an analysis of the benefit and importance of market-based mechanisms and an 
argument of their expansion in environmental regulation, see Chun Jaekyong, 
Hwangyeonggyuje Paradigmui Jaepyeon [Paradigm Shift of Environmental Regulation] 32 
hwangyEongbEoPyEongu 1 [Envtl. l. stud] 81, 106 (2010). 
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“transplantation” of substantial portions of the framework may be of more 
regional influence, but could become a beneficial reality in Southeast Asian 
nations well-situated to benefit from partnership with Korea to utilize cost-
effective emission reductions in the context of environmentally sound 
economic growth.
2.  “Green Growth Partnerships” and Certified Emission Reductions 
(“CERs”)
Korean green growth contemplates bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation and potential regional partnership opportunities,158) but is 
fundamentally based on domestic and potentially immediate initiatives. Of 
particular promise is the incentivization of private parties to engage their 
expertise in designing particular carbon credit-generating projects. Whether 
through an eventual cap-and-trade marketplace, or, as is more likely in the 
immediate future, as a component of the existing regulation of controlled 
emitting entities, the Korean green growth framework has the flexibility to 
incorporate emission-reduction projects abroad. To pursue the lowest-
marginal-cost mitigations, projects limiting emissions in developing 
countries, analogous to CDM projects under the Kyoto Protocol as a joint 
venture between developed and developing nations, have particular 
promise.
1) Opportunities for Forestry-Related Cooperation
Given the dramatic rate at which deforestation is happening worldwide, 
especially in the tropical regions where rainforests sequester the highest 
densities of carbon, programs that succeed in reducing the rate of 
deforestation, and achieve lasting preservation of carbon-rich forests 
through time, represent a potentially significant dimension of a carbon 
emission reduction strategy. Reducing deforestation rates by half of their 
present levels by 2050 and preserving the stock of forests for the following 
50 years would account for 12% of the amount of emission reductions 
necessary to satisfy the goal of a stable 450 parts per million of carbon 
158) LCGGFA, art. 61.
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dioxide in the atmosphere159) by 2100. In other words, the admittedly 
ambitious goal of implementing a worldwide biphasic forest preservation 
strategy (significant deforestation reduction through 2050, stable volume of 
forest from 2050 through 2100) could account for approximately one-eighth 
of the net mitigation efforts required to contain the approximate net climate 
impact of approximately a 2 degrees Celsius increase in average 
temperatures.160)
Forestry-related mitigation efforts contain two primary prongs, 
representing the bilateral exchange of benefits that can be understood to be 
the underlying bargain of international deforestation mitigation efforts. The 
developing, forested “host” country facilitates, in conjunction with third 
parties, the study necessary to gauge carbon stocks and subsequent 
monitoring of forest conditions. The host nation would further provide the 
legal promulgations necessary to create formal protection of forests, in a 
manner which provides protection of discrete tracts and also credibly allays 
concerns about “leakage.”161) Critically, the host nation also provides 
consistent enforcement of the relevant environmental protection laws to 
demonstrate that theorized carbon emission mitigation is realized at the 
implementation phase of the project.
In exchange, the partner parties, either private enterprises, international 
organizations, or foreign governments themselves, would provide the 
material compensation that forms the essential consideration of the forest 
protection agreement. While the simplest form of such compensation 
would amount to direct financial compensation, alternative approaches 
would structure this dimension of the benefit exchange in a manner that 
promotes the durability of forest protection through time, and underscores 
159) 450 parts per million of CO2 is a commonly stated stable figure projected to mitigate 
the net warming effect of GHG emissions through time. Based upon IPCC projections as well 
as studies conducted by other researchers, stabilization at 450 parts per million would, at a 
90% confidence interval, produce net temperatures between 1.3 and 3 degrees Celsius higher 
than global temperatures prior to the industrial revolution. See, e.g., Marshall Wise at al., 
Implications of Limiting CO2 Concentrations for Land Use and Energy, 324 sci. 1183, 1183 (2009); 
Nicholas Stern, What is the Economics of Climate Change?, 7 woRld Econ. 1, 2 (2006).
160) Stern, supra note 159, at 2.
161) This concern focuses on the possibility of displaced deforestation activities within the 
nation that offset the purportedly “additional” carbon sequestration achieved through the 
initial protection.
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the sustainability of the arrangement. In particular, transfer of technologies 
that could facilitate conservation-consistent economic development would 
be a valuable and durable contribution. The benefits of such transfers 
would ideally help to foster self-sufficiency and alternative livelihoods for 
individuals otherwise economically dependent upon exhaustive 
exploitation of forest resources.162) 
Depletion of forest resources is in no society’s long-term interest, and 
the implications of deforestation are more direct and invasive for rainforest 
countries in particular, who suffer not just the marginal consequences of 
emission-related climate change, but also the exhaustion of resources with 
few evident substitutes for economic invigoration. By building such 
alternative bases for “environmentally friendly” economic development, 
with real benefits for employment and distributive justice within the 
society, into the emission-mitigation project, the parties meaningfully 
advance the notion that the forest protection project can be both 
economically and socially sustainable.
2)  Policy Objectives for International Cooperation and Sustainable 
Development
The LCGGFA facilitates prospective cooperation on forestry-related 
projects. The discretion to provide developing countries with climate 
change-related “financial support”163) may have considerable application in 
the area of carbon sinks, such as aforestation and reforestation projects in 
the tropical regions of Southeast Asia. The LCGGFA specifically identifies 
forest carbon sinks as target area of environmental preservation (and 
carbon mitigation) strategy, acknowledging that the logic of carbon credit 
generation is not incompatible with the facts and social dynamics of 
aforestation projects.
International cooperation between Korean entities and parties in other 
nations for the achievement of emissions reductions must account for the 
162) This consideration relates to a significant human rights issue for developed nation 
participants in credit-generating programs: the terms of cooperation must induce developing 
governments to participate, but should also accrue to the benefit of the individuals in that 
developing nation, especially those individuals who might be materially adversely affected by 
the implementation of the program.
163) Id. art. 61.
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challenges and critiques that have already plagued CDM initiatives under 
the Kyoto Protocol: the accusation that such projects do not advance an 
underlying sustainable development objective; concerns about leakage; 
verifiable and convincing demonstrations of additionality; uneven 
geographic distribution of projects and benefits; and problematic 
distribution of benefits within the developing nation and the communities 
impacted by each project.164)  hese are all serious challenges, and their 
particular relevance in forest-related contexts demonstrates why an 
otherwise highly economical and attractive means of carbon emission 
mitigation has not yet emerged as a central dimension of international 
environmental policy.165)
As a general matter, to establish the credibility necessary to facilitate 
international investment, forest conservation-minded states should focus 
on demonstrating how sustainability will be satisfied within the context of 
a developing and, in many cases, raw material-consumption driven 
economy. Such a nation must make the credible case that land use patterns 
can change, in a meaningful and “net” sense nationwide, in a manner 
which can be maintained through time. To provide a compelling case for 
environmental protection (and carbon sink preservation) sustainability, 
such developing nation governments must account for the economic and 
social sustainability dimensions of their policies. 
V. Conclusion
As a cautionary note for generalizing the benefits of green growth, some 
Korean theorists conceive of green growth as just the latest essential 
revolution in the Korean economy.166) Citing a post-Korean War economy 
that was founded upon cost-advantageous and low-skill manufacturing, 
164) See Schroeder, supra note 28, at 34–36.
165) As discussed supra, the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol did not allow for forestry-
related emission credit-generating projects, based in large part on concerns about evidence of 
additionality and monitoring and credible political demonstrations necessary to address 
leakage concerns, in the present and through time.
166) See Jisoon Lee, supra note 12, at 43–48.
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then transformed into a knowledge-based, high-skill manufacturing 
economy, these economists see “green economy” as the tool to Korea’s 
continued growth and economic ascension.167) The very basis of this notion 
is not that “a rising tide lifts all boats,” but rather that Korea can once more 
utilize available opportunities to achieve a comparative advantage. 
Domestic legal action to promote environmentally conscious 
development and mitigate GHG emissions represent first steps in the 
direction of broader responses to anthropogenic impact on climate and 
other features of the natural world, and may have positive effects in 
catalyzing action in other nations or on the international level. However, 
just as the harms of GHG emissions and other human activities are not 
distributed equally, the diverse benefits of mitigation and adaptation 
policies will not be evenly shared. Rivalry for differentiated collateral 
benefits of protection of our shared atmosphere remains at the center of any 
multinational economic policy response to climate change.
A fundamental tension, not just in transplantability of particular 
legislation but in international cooperation in “green growth” in general, is 
the extent to which green growth benefits may be at least partially exclusive 
and subject to strategic acquisition and utilization by specific nations. Can 
the prospective parties to a forestry-related investment project, such as 
Korea or Korean private entities on one hand and a rainforest-dense 
country on the other, develop a framework for achieving lasting mutual 
benefit through meaningful carbon sequestration? Another important 
question is whether green growth provides a strong basis for facilitating 
economic development in countries that are currently developing. Having 
passed through resource-intensive “dirty” phases of development, Korea 
now apprehends an opportunity for harnessing “clean” development. Can 
countries that have not attained such development benefit from part or the 
entirety of this legal framework?  These are theoretical but also, in 
significant part, empirical questions, and they lie at the center of any future 
progress on bilateral or multilateral forest conservation efforts.
I conclude with an observation about the unique status and Korean 
domestic significance of prospective transplantation of green growth-
167) Id.
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related law to other legal systems. The perspective that the LCGGFA may 
provide source material for other nations in the drafting of domestic law, 
and potentially also inform the design of dimensions of international law, 
would mark a dramatic inflection point in Korean legal history. Korea has, 
for more than a century, been the recipient of many transplantations of 
law.168) Korea’s foundational codes, the Civil Code and the Criminal Code, 
were introduced during the Japanese occupation (Japan, in turn, had 
borrowed them from Germany and France).169) Other examples of imported 
law are numerous; the Korean Copyright Act represents just one specific 
illustration.170) While the post-World War II era has seen many innovations 
by Korean lawmakers, the trajectory of Korea-related borrowing remains in 
the direction of Korea as the recipient of foreign-made law. The significant 
international interest in the LCGGFA suggests that, in this area of policy, 
Korea may become, arguably for the first time, a source nation for legal 
transplantation. 
As discussed by Watson, a major basis for historical transplantations is 
the status of a particular source of law or legal jurisdiction as an established 
innovator of legal structures that are relatively widely adopted by 
recipients.171) Korea does not reside in a position of historical influence for 
exportation of its legal philosophies and administrative structures. Korean 
law stands to gain recognition in the international community only on the 
basis of its merit and innovativeness. The utilization by other nations of 
aspects or excerpts of the LCGGFA would be rooted squarely in the 
appraisal of the law (or the borrowed portion thereof) as efficacious and 
importable policy. Such an outcome would serve a central goal of the Act 
itself: to effectuate a subtle but critical shift in status as Korea more fully 
168) Seth, supra note 11, at 43 (2010) (describing Japanese colonial rule of Korea). The 
Japanese codes, in turn, were based on the civil law codes of continental European nations, 
especially Germany and France. Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 2–3.
169) Id. See also Walter Wallace McLaren, a Political histoRy of JaPan duRing thE mEiJi 
ERa: 1867-1912 (Cass 1965) (1916).
170) See soo-Kil chang Et al., intEllEctual PRoPERty law in KoREa 121 (Christopher Heath 
ed., 2003); see also John Leitner, A Legal and Cultural Comparison of File-Sharing Disputes in Japan 
and the Republic of Korea and Implications for Future Cyber-Regulation, 22 colum. J. asian l. 1, 
8–10 (2008).
171) See Watson, supra note 147.
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seeks to join the company of nations that not just assume obligations, but 
also offer constructive solutions to central global challenges.
KEy woRds: Climate Change, Green Growth, Sustainable Development, Forestry, REDD, 
Legal Transplantation, Carbon Credits, CER, CDM
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